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THE REVISION - POSTPONEMENT DISTINCTION IN 
THE 1970 CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS 
By Sander A. Rikleen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act) restructured existing 
state and federal programs for achieving clean air.2 The Amend-
ments emphasized attaining air quality levels that would protect 
public health and welfare, regardless of the availability of technol-
ogy capable of achieving these air quality levels. If necessary, tech-
nology would have to improve. Strict timetables included in the 
Amendments were designed to ensure rapid progress towards a goal 
of clean air. There was a spirit of accelerated movement towards 
this goal. 
Today the idealism of 1970 has given way to a spirit of delay. No 
longer is rapid achievement of an air quality that does not pose a 
threat to public health and welfare the most important goal. Other 
factors have been allowed to encroach upon the strict statutory 
timetables. A recent example of federal statutory retreat from these 
deadlines is the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination 
Act of 1974.3 This new statute will allow the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to issue suspensions of emissions limitations 
(applicable to stationary pollution sources) or to grant extensions of 
emission limitation deadlines whenever the Federal Energy Admin-
istrator orders power plants to switch to coal as a fuel source. The 
statute also provides for deferral of interim emissions standards for 
automobiles from 1975 to 1976. 
Another method of avoiding the deadlines created by the Amend-
ments has involved administrative and judicial retreat from strict 
compliance with the statutory standards for revisions and postpone-
ments. The propriety of this method of deadline avoidance is the 
subject of this article. 
Soon after passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments, the EPA 
promulgated regulations which interpreted them as allowing state-
granted deferrals of compliance deadlines for certain sources. These 
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deferrals were to be considered as "revisions" under the Amend-
ments, and were permissible as long as they did not interfere with 
attainment or maintenance of the national ambient air quality stan-
dards within the time specified in the state implementation plans. 
If attainment or maintenance of these standards was threatened, a 
postponement as provided by the Amendments was the exclusive 
form of relief.4 Nevertheless, the EPA approved state implementa-
tion plans permitting deferrals inconsistent with its own regula-
tions.5 
Five Circuits have heard challenges to EPA approval of such pro-
visions to date. 8 The First Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., Project on Clean Air v. Environmental Protection 
Agency7 (hereinafter referred to as Project on Clean Air), held that 
state-granted deferrals were permissible as hardship relief for pollu-
tion sources prior to the "mandatory attainment date," provided 
that they were treated as statutory "revisions" and the revisions did 
not interfer~ with achieving national ambient air quality standards 
on or before the applicable attainment date. After the "mandatory 
attainment date" a postponement as provided by statute was to be 
the exclusive form of relief for pollution sources. By contrast, the 
Fifth Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency,S held that the statutory postpone-
ment provision was the exclusive form of hardship relief for pollu-
tion sources in all time periods and that the statute was not in-
tended to grant states the flexibility envisioned by the First Circuit. 
The First Circuit's opinion has been followed by the Seconds and 
EighthlO Circuits. The Ninth Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Environmental Protection Agency,!1 adopted the EPA 
interpretation. Two District Courts have agreed with parts of the 
First Circuit decision and apparently accepted the EPA interpreta-
tion. 12 To date no other court has followed or agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit's decision. An EPA petition for certiorari was granted by the 
Supreme Court to review that portion of the Fifth Circuit decision 
dealing with state-granted deferrals. 13 Recently, the EPA amended 
its regUlations to be in accord with the holdings of the First, Second 
and Eighth Circuits. 14 
The EPA, First Circuit, and Fifth Circuit interpretations of the 
Amendments are the only ones relevant to the propriety of state-
granted deferrals under the Clean Air Act Amendments. The issue 
addressed by these interpretations and this article is the proper role 
of the revision-postponement distinction in the Amendments. The 
problem can be stated more specifically as a question: Can a provi-
sion of a compliance schedule found in a state implementation plan 
1970 CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS 561 
be deferred under any circumstances without resort to the statutory 
postponement provision found in the Amendments? 
The proper resolution of this question is important for a number 
of reasons. The Amendments establish an integrated national 
scheme for control of air pollution, affecting all states and sources, 
to be administered by a federal agency. Presently the states in the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits must apply an interpretation of the statute 
unlike that applied anywhere else in the country. This creates all 
of the problems associated with a lack of uniformity in the law. 
Geography determines the interpretation to be given to a federal law 
and the EPA must administer the law differently in different parts 
of the country, thus increasing administrative complexity. 
Even if uniformity is achieved, the Supreme Court's decision as 
to which interpretation is correct may have an important effect 
upon pollution sources and their control. Under the Fifth Circuit 
interpretation, a source unable to meet the time requirements of a 
state compliance schedule must meet the strict terms of the statu-
tory postponement provision. Failing that, it must limit operation 
or shut down. By contrast, both the original EPA interpretation and 
the First Circuit opinion allow for the possibility of other forms of 
relief. Each of the three interpretations also imposes different bur-
dens on the EPA administrative structure, since any allowance of 
state-granted deferral must be reviewed by it. A review mechanism 
must be set up to handle these revision requests, and it is at best 
undesirable that the criteria to be applied in such review should 
depend upon which Circuit Court's opinion must be accommodated 
in each case. Consequently, some differences in effect on air quality 
may be expected to result. 
This is not a transient issue. Some national ambient air quality 
standards (primary and secondary) do not have to be met until 
1977 .15 Thus, a Supreme Court ruling will determine the direction 
of developments at least for the next two years. However, the ques-
tion will not become moot in 1977. Upon revision of the national 
ambient air quality standards (as required by law)18 the time limit 
for attainment of the new national ambient air quality standards 
will run all over again}7 
The resolution of the revision - postponement distinction has been 
hampered by the complex nature of the statute and by the lack of 
clear, precise handling of this issue by the courts. The courts have 
not used uniform terminology when discussing their decisions. IS Os-
tensibly the same concept has been described by different words in 
different parts of the same opinion. II It has often been unclear which 
air quality standard or which deadline is being discussed.20 The 
reasoning has also lacked clarity. Arguments or interpretations have 
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been dismissed in a few words despite their apparent relevance. 21 
These shortcomings have not been present to the same degree in all 
opinions, but each failing has contributed to the confusion which 
now surrounds the process of revising or postponing emissions stan-
dards under the Amendments. 
This article seeks to clarify the confusion by reviewing the three 
interpretations and the recent EPA reaction to them. Several argu-
ments posed by commentators will also be reviewed. Not least im-
portant, special emphasis will be placed upon providing a clear 
analysis of the Amendments. 
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
Under the Amendments each state is given primary responsibility 
for its own air quality.22 The EPA Administrator is given the respon-
sibility for setting national primary and secondary ambient air qual-
ity standards,23 but states are not bound by these air quality stan-
dards; they may adopt more stringent ones if they so desire. 24 Each 
state is then required to adopt an implementation plan which in-
cludes provisions for attainment, maintenance, and enforcement of 
the national standards.25 Finally, each plan must be approved by 
the EPA.26 
Primary ambient air quality standards set limits for pollutants in 
the ambient air27 above which adverse effects on public health have 
been found. 28 Secondary, more stringent, standards set limits for 
pollutants in the ambient air above which adverse effects on public 
welfare are known or anticipated. 29 The standards, primary and 
secondary, are to be based on air quality criteria reflecting the latest 
scientific knowledge indicating the kind and extent of all identifia-
ble effects on public health and welfare which may be expected from 
the presence of pollutants in the ambient a.ir.30 
Timetables were established for setting up this new administra-
tive mechanism and achieving the national ambient air quality 
standards. The EPA Administrator had 120 days from the effective 
date of the Amendments in which to establish the national stan-
dards. 31 They were promulgated April 30, 1971.32 The states then 
had nine months to adopt implementation plans and submit them 
to the EPA for approval,33 The plans were due on January 30, 1972. 
Forty states met the deadline and the others submitted their plans 
a short time thereafter. 34 All implementation plans were required to 
provide for achieving the national primary standards as expedi-
tiously as practicable, but in no case later than three years from the 
date of the plan's approval. 35 Implementation plans were required 
to provide for achieving the national secondary standards within a 
reasonable time. 36 Finally, the Administrator was given four months 
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from the date required for submission of the plans to either approve 
or disapprove the plans in whole or in part.37 These actions were 
announced May 31, 1972.38 
Although the Amendments seek to achieve national ambient air 
quality standards by imposing limitations upon the emissions from 
specific pollution sources,3U· a recurring problem is presented by the 
difficulty of relating an individual source's emissions to the ambient 
air quality of a region. Another difficulty is caused by the complex 
wording of the Amendments. Part of the implementation plan con-
sists of a "control strategy" for air quality control regions within a 
state. This control strategy contains the "compliance schedules" 
which set the level of emissions permissible from each source and 
the date by which such level of emissions must be reached. These 
levels of emissions for particular sources, found in the state compli-
ance schedules, are variously referred to as "emissions limitations" 
or "emissions standards." 
The word "standards" is used in the Amendments in three differ-
ent senses, which must be carefully distinguished: (1) the "emis-
sions standards" (applicable to levels of emission from sources and 
found in the state implementation plan), (2) the national primary 
and secondary ambient air quality standards (applicable to the 
ambient air quality in an air quality control region and found in the 
regulations promulgated by the EPA 'Administrator), and, if desired 
by a state, (3) the stricter ambient air quality standards set under 
authority of §1857d-l (applicable to the ambient air quality in an 
air quality control region and found in the state implementation 
plan). 
There are also three deadlines of importance which must be care-
fully distinguished. These are: (1) the deadlines for source compli-
ance with the applicable emissions limitations (found in the state 
implementation plan), (2) the state-set deadlines for attainment of 
nationl;ll primary and secondary ambient air quality standards 
(found in the state implementation plan), and (3) the statutory 
deadline for attaining the national primary and secondary ambient 
air quality standards (found in the Amendments). 
Failure to keep these definitions and deadlines distinct has aggra-
vated the confusion surrounding those sections of the Amendments 
which provide for extensions, postponements, and revisions. Under 
certain circumstances the Administrator may grant an extension of 
up to two years for attainment of any national primary standard at 
the time he approves the state implementation plan.40 If difficulties 
in meeting standards are foreseen when the implementation plan is 
adopted, this section of the Amendments provides a means of ob-
taining extra time to overcome such difficulties. 
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In addition, state implementation plans may be modified, under 
certain circumstances, by means of revisions. The' major provision 
is found in §1857c-5(a)(2)(H). To be approved, the implementation 
plan must provide for revision of itself 
(i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of revisions 
of such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard or 
the availability of improved or more expeditious methods of achieving 
such primary or secondary standard; or (ii) whenever the Administrator 
finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan is sub-
stantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality pri- , 
mary or secondary standard which it implements. 
§1857c-5(a)(3) provides that the Administrator shall approve all 
revisions of an applicable implementation plan if they meet the 
requirements of §1857c-5(a)(2) and were adopted after reasonable 
notice and public hearings. 
After the implementation plan has been adopted, sources may 
delay emissions limitations deadlines by obtaining a postponement. 
Postponements are provided for in §1857c-5(f). In relevant part, this 
section provides: 
(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of 
moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of an 
applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to which 
such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the 
applicability of such requirement to such source (or class) for not 
more than one year. If the Administrator determines that -
(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such 
requirement before such date, 
(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such re-
quirement because the necessary technology or other alternative 
methods of control are not available or have not been available 
for a sufficient period of time, 
(C) any available alternative operating procedures and in-
terim control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact 
of such source on public health, and 
(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to na-
tional security or to the public health or welfare, 
then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such require-
ment. 
§1857c-5(f)(2)(B) provides for judicial review of any determination 
made under this paragraph. Postponements, however, are only a 
limited form of relief since they expire after one year and four spe-
cific criteria must be met before they will be granted. 
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One additional section is relevant to the subject of this article. 
§1857d-1 permits states to adopt stricter standards than those set 
by the Administrator, but also provides that "if an emission stan-
dard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation 
plan ... [a] State ... may not adopt or enforce any emission 
standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or 
limitation under such plan ... " 
III. THE ORIGINAL EPA INTERPRETATION 
The EPA provided the initial interpretation of the preceding sec-
tions of the Amendments. 41 The position adopted was that deadlines 
applicable to sources could be deferred, or postponed, under certain 
circumstances without resort to (and, therefore, without the restric-
tions imposed by) the statutory mechanism provided in §1857c-
5(f).42 The pertinent limitation to this interpretation was that the 
requested deferral could not prevent attainment or maintenance of 
a national standard within the time specified in the implementation 
plan. There were some further safeguards. Such deferrals were to be 
considered revisions of the implementation plan and approval by 
the EPA Administrator was required. The revisions would not be-
come part of the implementation plan until approved, and approval 
was conditioned upon meeting the requirements of the Amendments 
for the original approval of an implementation planY 
The first observation that can be made about this interpretation 
is that it is not suggested by the statutory wording. The EPA carved 
out a set of circumstances under which a deferral will not be called 
a postponement. But any officially-approved delay in compliance 
with deadlines would seem to be a postponement and the statute 
provides a mechanism for obtaining postponements, a mechanism 
apparently intended to be exclusive. 
Another interpretation seems to be more in agreement with the 
statutory wording; namely, that a revision of a requirement applica-
ble to a particular source can only be approved if it will improve the 
implementation plan.44 A change in a requirement applicable to a 
particular source which weakens the plan may only be obtained by 
receiving a postponement as provided by statute.45 
There are only two ways in which a change in a requirement 
applicable to a particular source can weaken an implementation 
plan. The change can postpone compliance with a deadline or make 
the emission limitation less stringent. The latter method is arguably 
prohibited by the Amendments. §1857d-1 prohibits a state from 
adopting or enforcing "any emission standard or limitation which 
is less stringent than the standard or limitation [in effect under the 
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applicable implementation plan]." The applicable implementation 
plan is the one approved by the Administrator under §1857c-
5(a)(2).46 Thus, this section seems to prevent a state from weakening 
requirements applicable to sources after they have been approved 
by the EPA Administrator. 
The other method of weakening an implementation plan, post-
ponement, is found in §1857c-5(f), as cited supra. The wording of 
the provision does not suggest that it is other than exclusive, yet the 
EPA took the position that this section leaves room for revisions 
which defer source compliance when deferral does not interfere with 
attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality stan-
dards. 
This construction of the statute appears faulty, because there is 
in the Amendments no indication of Congressional intent that revi-
sions should provide an alternative means of deferral. §1857c-5(e) 
(extension granted when the implementation plan is adopted) and 
§1857c-5(f) (deferral granted after the plan is adopted) are the two 
ways provided by the statute by which a source may obtain more 
time to comply with the requirements of the implementation plan. 
If revisions were intended to be an additional means of delaying a 
compliance date, they would presumably have been provided for in 
a hypothetical "§1857c-5(g)" immediately following the other two 
statutory means of delay. Revisions, however, were provided for in 
§1857c-5(a), demonstrating a probable lack of intent that they be 
such a form of relief. 
Therefore, the statutory wording permits, if it does not require, 
the conclusion that §1857c-5(f) is the exclusive mechanism provided 
by the Amendments for weakening an implementation plan by ob-
taining hardship relief for a pollution source. Because of §1857d-l, 
the requirement applicable to the source could not be made less 
stringent but it may be deferred by obtaining a postponement under 
§ 1875c-5(f). 
Several other challenges to the EPA interpretation have been 
raised. It has been argued that revisions were intended only to im-
prove implementation plans, since the revisions provided for in 
§1857c-5(a)(2)(H) serve only that functionY Revisions to take ac-
count of the availability of improved or faster methods of achieving 
national ambient air quality standards, or to correct an implemen-
tation plan inadequate to achieve the standards, clearly would im-
prove an implementation plan. A revision taking account of a 
change in national standards would also improve the implementa-
tion plan since a weaker national standard (if a national ambient 
air quality standard may be weakened) would render a revision of 
the implementation plan unnecessary. 
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On the other hand, §1857c-5(a)(2) contains provisions that must 
appear in a state's implementation plan before it can be approved. 
There is no prohibition against inclusion of other provisions. There-
fore, although §1857c-5(a)(2)(H) only lists revisions which will im-
prove an implementation plan, there are probably other permissible 
grounds for revisions. 
As promulgated, the original EPA interpretation did not seem to 
be in strict accord with the statutory wording. 48 The EPA appar-
ently would have allowed a permanent deferral of an emission limi-
tation if doing so would not affect attainment or maintenance of a 
national ambient air quality standard. However, a permanent defer-
ral is clearly equivalent to the adoption of a less stringent emission 
standard}» This would be in direct contravention of §1857d-l which 
prohibits a state from adopting an emission standard or limitation 
less stringent than the one in effect under the approved implemen-
tation plan. The EPA interpretation should, therefore, be construed 
to prohibit at least permanent deferrals. 
A law review article, written by an EPA attorney (Mr. Luneburg) 
expressing his own views, marshalled several arguments in support 
of the EPA's interpretation.50 The author took the position that the 
Amendments contemplated that a state could modify its implemen-
tation plan in any way it chose - relaxing or strengthening it on a 
temporary or permanent basis - as long as the modified plan met 
the requirements for approval of the original implementation plan. 
Support for this position was based upon two major points. First, 
the overriding Congressional goal of the Amendments was to 
achieve, within the statutory time span, a level of air quality that 
would not harm public health or welfare. Second, the administra-
tive scheme for achieving this air quality should not be overly harsh 
on sources which were attempting to comply but were unable to do 
so for a variety of reasons. The EPA interpretation was consistent 
with this Congressional goal and avoided harsh effects on sources 
insofar as possible. Thus, the author characterized the EPA inter-
pretation as the most reasonable interpretation of the Amendments. 
Luneburg's comment regarding Congressional goals is justifiedY 
The amelioration of possible harsh effects on sources, however, was 
provided for in §1857c-5(f). This section is the only clear statutory 
provision providing a means of deferring compliance deadlines after 
an implementation plan has been adopted. To obtain such a statu-
tory postponement four specific criteria must be satisfied.52 The 
inability to comply with the compliance deadline must be caused 
by an unavailability of control methods; prohibitive cost is not a 
sufficient excuse. The continued operation of the source must be 
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essential to national security or public health or welfare. Two other 
showings must also be made: good faith efforts to comply and alter-
native procedures in use to reduce the impact of the source on public 
health. Luneburg argued that it would be unreasonable to interpret 
§ 1857c-5(f) as being the exclusive form of hardship relief for a pollu-
tion source since it is so harsh that most sources could never meet 
its terms. Many sources might be denied relief because of inability 
to satisfy the four criteria, even if deferral in their cases would not 
hinder attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality 
standards. He concluded by citing legislative history for the proposi-
tion that §1857c-5(f) was meant to apply only if deferral would 
prevent attainment or maintenance of a primary standard within 
three years. 
The harsh effects of restricting hardship relief to the §1857c-5(f) 
mechanism is the best argument in favor of the EPA interpretation. 
Many sources might otherwise be denied relief even though granting 
a deferral would not jeopardize achievement of the Congressional 
goal. There are, however, two countervailing factors which under-
mine the arguments in favor of the EPA interpretation. The inter-
pretation imposes administrative burdens on the EPA which may 
have been foreseen by Congress and specifically avoided by provid-
ing §1857c-5(f) as the exclusive means of hardship relief in the 
Amendments. Secondly, the legislative history of §1857c-5(f) is not 
as clear as Luneburg has suggested. While the history and purpose 
can be said to be compatible with Luneburg's position, they are 
equally compatible with the exclusivity of the postponement provi-
sion as a means of hardship relief for sources. Legislative history and 
purpose are not determinative of the issue in this instance. 
The unreasonableness of interpreting §1857c-5(f) as the exclusive 
form of hardship relief for pollution sources can be demonstrated if 
the statute is looked at from the point of view of the sources. But 
such an interpretation is entirely reasonable if the administrative 
problems caused by alternative means of relief are considered. De-
terminations of the effect of a deferral on attainment or mainte-
nance of national standards is time consuming and difficult. At 
least one commentator has pointed out that it is virtually impossi-
ble to relate, with any certainty, emissions from a single source to 
ambient air quality in a region. 53 Final responsibility for such a 
determination, and the attendant workload, would fall on the 
EPA-not on the polluter involved. Interpreting §1857c-5(f) to be 
the exclusive remedy would avoid this problem entirely. Making 
deferrals easier to obtain could also be expected to increase the 
number of deferral requests, and consequently the administrative 
burden. Exclusive use of §1857c-5(f) would minimize this problem.54 
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Such a result (avoiding as much administrative difficulty as pos-
sible) may have been specifically intended by Congress. Under pre-
vious law there had been an administrative hesitancy to act55 and 
Congress was aware that the threat of air pollution required swift 
action. 56 The Amendments were to provide effective national con-
trol57 and the complexities of the problem necessitated a complex 
administrative structure. Any unnecessary complications, however, 
should be avoided if at all possible. 
While as noted above the Congressional goal is compatible with 
Luneburg's position, the legislative history of §1857c-5(f) which he 
cited does not support his interpretation. Luneburg's argument re-
lied on §111(f) of the Senate bill sent to the Conference Commit-
tee,58 the only provision like §1857c-5(f) that could be found in the 
drafts of the Amendments. The Senate Report explanation of 
§l11(f) noted that compliance with a national ambient air quality 
standard deadline might not be possible and that in such a situa-
tion, § l11(f) could be used to obtain relief from expiration of the 
deadline. 59 This report cannot refer to §1857c-5(f), however, because 
the two sections refer to different deadlines. §111(f) spoke of relief 
for a region from expiration of the time for achieving national am-
bient air quality standards. §1857c-5(f) speaks only of relief for a 
source from any plan requirement. With this in mind, Luneburg's 
interpretation loses much of its initial plausibility. 
One commentator, writing after the First Circuit's decision in 
Project on Clean Air6° rejected the pre-attainment/post-attainment 
distinction found in that decision and argued that the flexibility 
found in the pre-attainment period should apply in the post-
attainment period as well. 61 It was argued that exclusive use of 
§ 1857 c-5(f) would cause numerous firms to close because of their 
inability to come within its terms even though their continued oper-
ation would not affect attainment or maintenance of national am-
bient air quality standards. Such a result would be unduly harsh, 
particularly in the absence of an explicit manifestation of Congres-
sional intent. Therefore, the argument concludes, §1857c-5(f) 
should apply only when attainment or maintenance of national 
ambient air quality standards would be jeopardized. This is the 
same argument that Luneburg raised in support of the EPA inter-
pretation. As pointed out above, this argument can be used to sup-
port the propriety of deferral by revision. 
However, the argument that permitting no alternative to §1857c-
5(f) postponement would be unduly harsh on pollution sources does 
not answer the contention that this potentially coercive effect is 
apparently what Congress intended, judging from the wording and 
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structure of the statute. Those arguing in support of the EPA inter-
pretation have generally ignored the arguments which support an 
interpretation of the Amendments favoring deferral only by post-
ponement. Their position implies greater concern for the hardships 
of polluters than for a drastic increase in the EPA's workload. A well 
reasoned argument for the EPA interpretation should include an 
explanation of the reasons for rejection of contrary interpretations 
despite the weight of the arguments in favor of these other interpre-
tations. Thus far only the Ninth Circuit82 has come close to offering 
such an explanation. 
IV. CASES ADOPTING THE EPA INTERPRETATION 
To date only two cases have arisen in which the validity of a 
deferral actually granted by a state to a source was challenged. All 
other cases have dealt with challenges to EPA approval of state 
implementation plans containing provisions permitting such defer-
rals. In the first of these two cases, Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, 
Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 83 the court held that it lacked juris-
diction to consider a challenge to the appropriateness of the state-
granted deferral and so the court's statements about this question 
were merely dicta. Nevertheless the decision merits some attention. 
In Stauffer a one year deferral of the applicability of an emission 
limitation was approved by the EPA Administrator because it 
would not interfere with maintenance of a national primary stan-
dard. The petitioner challenged the deferral, arguing that it should 
be classified as a postponement (and therefore subject to the 
§1857c-5(f) procedure), rather than a revision. The respondent 
argued that it was a pre-attainment revision and cited Project on 
Clean Air" as precedent.85 The court's dicta in the Stauffer opinion 
seemed to favor the EPA interpretation of the Amendments. 
The court expressed only one reason for preferring the EPA inter-
pretation: its concern that exclusive use of §1857c-5(f) would dis-
courage states from setting ambitious compliance schedules. The 
reality of this danger is unclear, as will be shown below, when the 
impact of adoption of one of the three interpretations of the Amend-
ments is considered. 
Although only one consideration prompted the. court to reach its 
position on this complex problem, the opinion was clearly written. 
The court discussed both primary and secondary ambient air qual-
ity standards. It also made clear which attainment date it was talk-
ing about. Revisions (deferrals) would not be allowed to interfere 
with attainment of a national ambient air quality standard by the 
date specified in the state implementation plan. 
1970 CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS 571 
One writer claims66 that the second case dealing with the validity 
of a deferral already granted to a source, Metropolitan Washington 
Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia,67 reached much the 
same conclusion as the Stauffer court. 68 In the Metropolitan 
Washington case the deferral (revision) was upheld despite the 
plaintiffs argument that the EPA interpretation made §1857c-5(f) 
meaningless. 69 A careful reading of the opinion in light of the facts 
of the case, however, discloses that the court did not agree entirely 
with the EPA interpretation but dealt only with deferral by revision 
under certain circumstances. 
In Metropolitan Washington, the Mayor-Commissioner of the 
District of Columbia sought a variance (deferral) for a municipal 
incinerator. Under the applicable implementation plan the inciner-
ator was supposed to discontinue operation on July 4, 1973. The 
variance (deferral) was sought because meeting the deadline would 
cause "an immediate crisis" in the city's waste management pro-
gram. "Severe adverse effects on the health and welfare of the citi-
zens of the District of Columbia" were also predicted. The variance 
(deferral) was granted, allowing continued operation for less than 
one year, to June 30, 1974. 
The court recognized that both statutory wording and policy con-
siderations supported the plaintiffs arguments,70 but avoided con-
sideration of either of these issues, focusing instead on the rejection 
of the plaintiffs arguments by the First and Eighth Circuits. 71 The 
Metropolitan Washington court failed to point out that neither of 
the cited cases discussed either this particular statutory wording or 
policy consideration. The facts before it seemed to be the decisive 
element in the case for the court. In light of the cases cited, the 
silence of the legislative history, "and the context of this case"72 
[emphasis added], the court agreed that the Administrator had 
authority to treat certain deferrals as revisions rather than post-
ponements. In an addendum to the decision filed when plaintiffs 
motion to alter or amend judgment was denied, the court again 
spoke of the circumstances of the case. After considering the Fifth 
Circuit's Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental 
Protection Agency73 decision for the first time, the court decided 
that, "[i]n light of the fact that the District of Columbia Circuit 
has not yet spoken on the controlling question of law which is open 
to substantial dispute, and in light of the severe consequences of an 
injunction herein ... "74 [emphasis added], the motion would be 
denied. 
The emphasized words in the conclusions of both the main opin-
ion and the addendum above emphasize the important role that the 
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consequences of an injunction played in the court's decision. The 
court approved the use of revisions as a means for granting deferrals 
under certain circumstances. The facts of the case were held to be 
such appropriate circumstances. Since no other circumstances 
under which deferral by revision might be permissible were consid-
ered, the holding of the case must be limited to its facts. 
On those facts, it seems that §1857c-5(f) could have provided 
appropriate relief without resort to a revision. A delay of less than 
one year was requested and it was alleged that continued operation 
was essential to public health and welfare. The only remaining re-
quirements of §1857c-5(f) left to be met were good faith efforts to 
comply, interim measures to reduce the impact of the pollution 
source on health, and the absence of available technology or alter-
nate methods of control. Arguably, the Metropolitan Washington 
case presented a fact situation tailor-made for a §1857c-5(f) post-
ponement. 
The decision emphasizes that lack of an alternative to postpone-
ment may have harsh consequences on public health. By the time 
the court's decision was reached, a §1857c-5(f) postponement was 
unavailable because the time for application for a postponement 
had passed. The decision seems to be precedent for the proposition 
that deferral by revision is available when a postponement is una-
vailable only because the time for application for a postponement 
has passed. The court did not specifically so hold but support for 
such a proposition can be found in the emphasis on circumstances 
and the necessary limitation of the holding of the case to its facts. 
The court's opinion notes that certain deferrals may be treated as 
revisions. Such a statement seems initially to indicate an adoption 
of the EPA interpretation. Only after careful reading of the decision 
and the reasons the court gave for its holding does the proposition 
of law for which this case stands become clear. The court did not 
go so far as to adopt the EPA interpretation. However, the failure 
of the court to clearly state exactly what it was deciding only in-
creases the confusion surrounding the revision-postponement provi-
sions in the Amendments. 
The facts of the case also point out a potential problem caused 
by allowing deferrals through the use of revisions. The deferral in 
Metropolitan Washington took effect in July 1973 and at the date 
of decision in February 1974 the EPA Administrator had still not 
approved it. 75 A similar fact pattern was presented in Stauffer, 
where the variance took effect in January and was not approved 
until May.78 The EPA Administrator claimed in Project on Clean 
Air77 that he could control improper deferrals since all deferrals were 
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to be treated as revisions and were subject to EPA approval.78 The 
facts of Metropolitan Washington and Stauffer show that the EPA 
Administrator does not have the control he claimed to have. Two 
commentators have said that the source is subject to an enforce-
ment action until the revision is approved79 and Stauffer said that 
there could be a suit for damages, or injunctive relief should dam-
ages be denied.so Even so, allowing deferrals to go into effect prior 
to EPA approval of them seems to violate the spirit of the Amend-
ments. The propriety of such a procedure is doubtful and should be 
scrutinized carefully. 
The most recent case dealing with the revision-postponement dis-
tinction arose in the Ninth Circuit. Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Environmental Protection Agency8J involved a petition 
for review of EPA approval of those portions of the Arizona imple-
mentation plan permitting deferrals without resort to a §1857c-5(f) 
postponement. The petitioners argued that §1857c-5(f) should pro-
vide the only means of hardship relief while the respondent argued 
for adoption of the First Circuit interpretation.82 The court accepted 
neither approach, and adopted the original EPA interpretation in-
stead. Deferrals not threatening attainment or maintenance of na-
tional ambient air quality standards could be treated as revisions 
instead of as §1857c-5(f) postponements.83 
The court based its decision on legislative history and Congres-
sional intent. §111(f) of the Senate bill sent to the Conference Com-
mittee was discussed along with the Senate report concerning that 
provision.8f The court felt that §l11(f), and thus §1857c-5(f) as well, 
was intended to encompass only those modifications of an imple-
mentation plan which would inhibit attainment or maintenance of 
national ambient air quality standards in a region. With §1857c-5(f) 
limited to deferrals threatening attainment or maintenance of na-
tional standards, the court turned to consideration of deferrals that 
did not create such a threat. No legislative intent could be found to 
commit a state to its initial implementation plan without any flexi-
bility. Furthermore, the wording "as expeditiously as practicable" 
in §1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) and the" ... Act's exhortation to the states 
to promulgate implementation plans even stricter than that re-
quired to attain national ambient air standards ... "85 found in 
§1857d-1 indicated that such flexibility was to exist. The interpreta-
tion adopted was said to be a "necessary adjunct to the statutory 
scheme."86 
The First Circuit interpretation87 was rejected because there was 
no statutory basis for treating deferrals not threatening attainment 
or maintenance of national ambient air quality standards differ-
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ently in the pre-attainment and post-attainment peroids. The court 
therefore concluded that deferrals should be treated the same in 
both time periods. The Fifth Circuit conception of the statutory 
wording as "unambiguous"88 was rejected, thus creating the need to 
consult legislative history and purpose. §1857c-5(f) was conceded to 
be unambiguous by itself, but when it was juxtaposed against the 
"expeditiously as practicable" language of §1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) and 
the lack of a definition of "revisions", ambiguity arose. 
The Ninth Circuit did avoid many of the shortcomings of previous 
cases. It discussed the precedents and explained the reasons for its 
departure from them. The reasoning was clear and the decision did 
not seem to create problems that would lead to future litigation. The 
court's reasoning, despite its clarity of explanation, is, however, 
subject to criticism. 
It is not at all obvious that the statutory wording is so lacking in 
clarity that a court must resort to the legislative history. As pointed 
out above, a reading of the statute seems to clearly direct that all 
deferrals be treated as §1857c-5(f) postponements. Even assuming 
that the legislative history should be considered, the court's reading 
of §111(f) seems incorrect. As noted previously, that section spoke 
of relief for a region from deadlines for achieving national ambient 
standards. §1857c-5(f), on the other hand, speaks of relief for a 
source from any implementation plan requirement. Thus the legis-
lative history does not speak on the subject of the original EPA 
interpretation. This considerably weakens the force of the court's 
arguments in support of the EPA interpretation, and greatly weak-
ens the precedential value of the decision. 
V. THE FIRST CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court directly 
confronted with the revision-postponement distinction. Project on 
Clean Airs' involved a petition for review of the EPA Administra-
tor's approval of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts implementa-
tion plans. These plans contained provisions allowing deferrals of 
compliance schedule requirements applicable to pollution sources 
without resort to §1857c-5(f). The petitioner argued that §1857c-5(f) 
should be the exclusive means of hardship relief for a pollution 
source. The EPA argued for acceptance of its interpretation of the 
Amendments. 
The court adopted neither approach, holding that the implemen-
tation plans were improperly approved. In so doing, the court pro-
pounded a new interpretation of the Amendments. A pre-
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attainment period and a post-attainment period were found in the 
statute, derived from §1857c-5(a)(2)(B) which speaks of attainment 
and maintenance of national ambient air quality standards. Accord-
ing to the court, the cut-off date was the "mandatory attainment 
date" for achieving national standards. Prior to that date, the EPA 
Administrator could allow states to grant variances (deferrals by 
revision) that did not interfere with achievement or maintenance of 
national standards. After that date, §1857c-5(f) was to be the only 
means of hardship relief for a source. 
The existence of two time periods in the statute is clear. There is 
a time period before the deadline and a time period after it. But 
nowhere can support be found for giving a different role to §1857c-
5(f) in each period. The statute does not provide for different treat-
ments of revisions or deferrals depending on when they are applied 
for.90 Likewise, nothing in the legislative history supports the dis-
tinction adopted by the court. 91 In fact, the two Congressional re-
ports cited by the court to support the exclusive use of §1857c-5(f) 
in the post-attainment period92 should apply with the same force to 
the pre-attainment period. Either the flexibility during the pre-
attainment period should always exist or else the exclusivity of 
§1857c-5(f) during the post-attainment period should always exist. 
The court's only explanation for making the distinction was that it 
was a "necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme, which anticipates 
greater flexibility during the pre-attainment period."93 In partial 
support of this conclusion the court considered the §1857c-
5(a)(2)(A) provision for reaching national primary ambient air qual-
ity standards as expeditiously as practicable. Admittedly, the stan-
dards were not to be achieved immediately. Nor was there any 
requirement that emissions limitations be met immediately. While 
these provisions allow a state to adopt an implementation plan 
providing for a gradual attainment of ambient air quality standards, 
they do not demonstrate an intention that applicability of emissions 
limitations, once set, could be deferred. §1857c-5(f) specifically re-
stricts such deferrals but the court ignored this section in its consid-
eration of the pre-attainment period. 
The court quoted H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146 on the Congressional 
goal of expeditious imposition of emissions limitations and their 
effective enforcement. The Report's tone of urgency does not sup-
port a finding of flexibility. Neither does S. Rep. No. 91-1196, also 
cited by the court, to the effect that sources should meet the stan-
dard or close down. 94 In the Senate debates, Senator McIntyre ob-
served that the time for flexibility had passed and action was re-
quired. 95 In short, the statutory scheme hardly seems to anticipate 
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"greater flexibility in the pre-attainment period." 
The First Circuit also noted that if no flexibility were allowed, 
states would adopt more lenient compliance schedule deadlines to 
accommodate those sources unable to meet stricter deadlines. This 
may be true. While the statute may have been intended to force 
technology to catch up with standards,Bs the states will not be in-
clined to motivate technology to develop at a faster rate than the 
law requires unless some flexibility in granting deferrals is allowed. 
The court assumed that if flexibility were not provided, sources 
would pressure states to adopt the weakest possible compliance 
schedules. Although this assumption is plausible, the court's rem-
edy did little to encourage sources to accede to stricter compliance 
schedules in exchange for a possibility of deferral if they were unable 
to meet an approaching deadline. Deferral is not automatic. The 
deferral may not threaten attainment or maintenance of national 
standards and the EPA Administrator must approve the deferral 
before it is permissible. Also, according to the court's decision, the 
deferral must end on or before the applicable attainment date. Even 
assuming that a source felt entitled to a deferral, there would still 
be administrative red tape, a risk that the deferral would not be 
granted or approved, and any deferral which was granted might be 
limited. Thus, even under the First Circuit's interpretation, sources 
could be expected to pressure states to adopt more lenient compli-
ance schedules. While the court may have correctly foreseen the 
problem, the interpretation adopted seems unlikely to resolve it. 
In discussing the pre-attainment period, the court ignored the 
clear wording of § 1857 c-5(f); in discussing the post-attainment pe-
riod, it largely ignored the respondent's arguments. The latter sec-
tion of the opinion seemed to be addressed to the implementation 
plans which had been approved. The court said that open-ended 
exemptions in the post-attainment period might interfere with 
maintenance of an ambient air quality standard, but the EPA con-
tended that under 40 C.F.R. §51.32(f) it would only allow deferrals 
that did not threaten maintenance of such standards.17 The court 
said that §1857c-5(f) would be meaningless if a less restrictive defer-
ral mechanism existed side by side with it, but under 40 C.F.R. 
§51.32(f) the EPA could have invoked §1857c-5(f) any time attain-
ment or maintenance of an ambient air quality standard was threat-
ened. 
After determining that §1857c-5(f) was to provide the exclusive 
form of hardship relief in the post-attainment period, the court 
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quickly dismissed the Administrator's arguments. It stated that the 
Administrator's arguments would effectively substitute a less rigor-
ous procedure for the one Congress enacted, and if the EPA inter-
pretation was the one intended, Congress would have said so. Ironi-
cally, the rest of the opinion was based upon the distinction between 
pre- and post-attainment time periods, as to which Congress was 
equally silent. 
Since the court's arguments rejecting the EPA interpretation of 
§ 1857 c-5(f} in the post-attainment period were not even directed at 
the merits of the EPA interpretation, they are not necessarily persu-
asive reasons for rejecting the EPA arguments. The court relied 
mainly on two quotations from Congressional reports98 which may 
be directed against the EPA interpretation. However, only one of 
these quotations is at all indicative that §1857c-5(f) should be the 
exclusive means for hardship deferrals during the post-attainment 
time period. While H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146 supports exclusivity of 
§1857c-5(f}, the material cited from S. Rep. No. 91-1196 does not 
even refer to emissions limitations, which is what § 1857c-5(f} covers. 
The quoted portion of the Senate report comes from a paragraph 
speaking of ambient air quality standards, not emissions standards. 
Thus it cannot be considered to show Senate intent with respect to 
emissions standards.99 Furthermore, the Senate hearings showed 
great concern for public health and welfare (and therefore attain-
ment and maintenance of national primary and secondary stan-
dards) but did not discuss polluters whose short deferral of emis-
sions limitations would not jeopardize health and welfare (or attain-
ment and maintenance of national primary and secondary stan-
dards}.lOo 
Not only was the court's interpretation of the Amendments un-
supported by its reasoning, but its failure to use uniform terminol-
ogy made the meaning of the decision unclear. Despite citing the 
wording of §1857c-5(a){2}{B} referring to attainment and mainte-
nance of primary and secondary standards, the court's discussion 
and arguments only refer to primary standards. The remedy ordered 
by the court then speaks of "compliance dates for attainment of 
na tional primary and secondary standards." 101 This confusion 
makes it uncertain whether the court's interpretation of the Amend-
ments refers only to primary standards, or to both primary and 
secondary standards. Was the "mandatory compliance date" the 
date for compliance with primary standards or was there a pre-
attainment and post-attainment period for both primary and sec-
ondary standards? The EPA Administrator has interpreted the 
opinion to deal only with primary standards despite the wording of 
the remedy. 102 
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The decision also is unclear as to the cut-off date ending the pre-
attainment period and beginning the post-attainment period. Was 
this the State-set attainment date or the statutory "latest date for 
compliance?" The court at various times in the opinion alterna-
tively referred to this date as the "mandatory attainment date, "103 
the "mandatory compliance date,"104 and the "federal compliance 
dates for attainment of national primary and secondary stan-
dards."105 Resolution of this question was particularly important in 
this case, since, at the time of the decision, Rhode Island had set 
an attainment date which was earlier than the three year statutory 
limit. lOft 
The court also failed to comment on the effect of a two-year 
§ 1857 c-5( e) extension for attainment of primary standards. Such an 
extension might be interpreted to have no effect on the expiration 
of the pre-attainment period; on the other hand, it could be under-
stood to extend the pre-attainment period despite passage of over 
three years (the statutory limit for achieving national primary am-
bient air quality standards). The court should have addressed this 
issue since Massachusetts had received a two-year extension for 
some pollutants under §1857c-5(e).107 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency,108 decided by the Eighth Circuit, 
added nothing to the resolution of the problem. In that case the 
court discussed and quoted from the First Circuit decision and then 
adopted the remedy word for word. The only statement contributed 
by the Eighth Circuit was, "we think it proper that provisions of the 
Iowa plan be in specific accord with federal statutory requirements. 
Accordingly, we adopt the remedy outlined in the First Circuit opin-
ion ... "100 Apparently the court felt that because the arguments 
advanced by the petitioner and respondent were exactly the same 
in the two cases, it could follow the First Circuit decision without 
addressing the arguments presented or redressing the ambiguities 
inherent in the First Circuit's decision. 
The Eighth Circuit did face a problem not found in the First 
Circuit case. At the time of the decision, some regions in Iowa had 
met the national primary standards for some pollutants but had not 
yet met the national secondary standards for those pollutants. llo 
When a primary standard has been attained prior to the "manda-
tory attainment date" does the pre-attainment period end or con-
tinue? However, the court did not deal with this issue. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency,1I1 decided by the Second Circuit, 
the facts and arguments were the same as those in the First and 
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Eighth Circuit cases. As in the Eighth Circuit, the case was disposed 
of quickly. "We agree with the holdings in the First and Eighth 
Circuits .... We do not agree with the contrary Fifth Circuit hold-
ing on this issue."112 No explanation of the reasons for this choice 
between Circuits was given even though the addendum to the 
Metropolitan Washington decision, filed the day before, had found 
the question open to substantial dispute. 
The Second Circuit's decision only spoke of primary standards. 
The First Circuit opinion at least appeared to refer to primary and 
secondary standards, as noted above. The Second Circuit also 
stated that the mandatory deadline ending the pre-attainment pe-
riod was May 31, 1975. The court did not explain why this was so 
but a look at the implementation plan attainment dates for ambient 
air quality standards in New York provides some possible answers.n3 
Either one of two dates could arguably have been chosen as the 
deadline for attaining the primary standards: May 31, 1975 (three 
years from the implementation plan's approval); or May 31, 1977 
(incorporating a two year §1857c-5(e) extension). Thus the court 
must have concluded that the mandatory attainment date is unaf-
fected by the granting of a §1857c-5(e) extension. It is impossible 
to tell whether the mandatory attainment date referred to by the 
court was the one set by the implementation plan or the statutory 
three year limit, since in this case they coincided. 
Adoption of the First Circuit interpretation will not bring cer-
tainty into this area of the law. Several issues remain to be resolved 
in the courts. These issues include (1) What is the date which ends 
the pre-attainment period? This issue in turn raises two further 
questions: (a) does the pre-attainment period refer only to the inter-
val before primary standards are attained, or does it include the 
entire period prior to attainment of both primary and secondary 
standards? (b) what is the "mandatory compliance date?" Is it the 
implementation plan .date, the federal statutory latest date, or the 
actual date on which standards are attained if this comes first? (2) 
What is the effect of a §1857c-5(e) extension on the time period in 
which revisions (deferrals) may be granted? (3) Is a state revision 
(deferral) legally effective before it is approved by the EPA Admin-
istrator? None of these issues were identified by the courts but they 
were present in the decisions which adopted the First Circuit inter-
pretation. 
Indeed, the only appealing aspect of the First Circuit interpreta-
tion is that it has been adopted by three Circuits. This weight of 
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authority should not be misleading. The interpretation adopted was 
not supported by the court's reasoning and many questions were left 
unanswered by the decision. Having failed to resolve (or even ac-
knowledge) these questions, the three Circuits may well be haunted 
by their reappearance in future suits. Furthermore, the Second and 
Eighth Circuits offered no explanation for their adoption of the First 
Circuit interpretation. It is not unfair to say that no adequate rea-
sons have ever been offered by any court for its adoption. 
VI. THE FIFTH CmculT INTERPRETATION 
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency114 when 
faced with a challenge to approval of the Georgia implementation 
plan. Even though it faced the same facts and arguments that the 
First, Second and Eighth Circuits had faced, the court held that 
§1857c-5(O provided the only method of deferring the applicability 
of any requirement to a source. 
The Fifth Circuit began its opinion by pointing out that nothing 
in §1857c-5(O limited that section to deferrals threatening attain-
ment of a national ambient air quality standard. Relying on the 
words "any source" and "any requirement" in §1857c-5(O, which 
the court characterized as "unambiguous," it stated that §1857c-
5(0 postponements were intended to be changes in application of a 
requirement to a particular party. §1857c-5(a)(3) revisions were 
meant to be changes in generally applicable requirements. Revi-
sions under §1857c-5(a)(2)(H) may change a requirement applica-
ble to a particular party by making the requirement inore stringent. 
It would be ridiculous to try to make such a change under the 
section for postponements. Therefore, revisions are not limited to 
changes in generally applicable requirements. Nevertheless, the in-
terpretation adopted by the court is the one implied by the statutory 
wording as was pointed out in the beginning of the discussion of the 
original EPA interpretation (Section III supra). 
Finding support for its interpretation of the Amendments in the 
statutory scheme, the court observed that the statute forces technol-
ogy to catch up with promulgated ambient air quality standards. 
§1857c-5(O was the mechanism used to ensure that ambitious com-
mitments made at the planning stage could not be easily abandoned 
as deadlines approached. According to the Fifth Circuit, Congress 
wished departures from earlier commitments to be unusual and 
difficult to obtain. Using any other deferral procedure would not 
permit §1857c-5(O to fulfill its Congressionally intended role. 
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As pointed out in the discussion of the EPA interpretation, legis-
lative history and purpose are not dispositive of this problem; at 
most, the history shows compatibility of the interpretation with 
Congressional goals. During the Senate debates Senator Montoya 
observed that the postponement provision recognizes that perform-
ance may be impossible, but the safeguards imposed upon the 
postponement-granting process ensure that it will be used sparingly 
and only as necessary to provide an incentive for maximum effort 
to seek clean air.1I5 This statement was not cited by the court but it 
supports the court's conception of the statutory scheme. However, 
as noted previously, the major concern of Congress was in protecting 
public health and welfare. Such a concern is perfectly compatible 
with deferrals which do not interfere with attainment or mainte-
nance of national ambient air quality standards which have been set 
up to protect health and welfare. 118 Thus both the EPA and Fifth 
Circuit interpretations may be said to be compatible with one or 
another Congressional goal. 
Disagreeing with the First Circuit's finding of pre-attainment pe-
riod flexibility, the Fifth Circuit observed that nothing in the stat-
ute provided support for the other court's conclusion. The Fifth 
Circuit did not discuss the argument that exclusive use of §1857c-
5(f) as hardship relief for sources would bring about lenient compli-
ance schedules, because the Fifth Circuit's decision was based pri-
marily on what it considered to be clear statutory wording. 
With the exception of that portion of the opinion which labelled 
all changes in requirements applicable to a particular party as post-
ponements, the Fifth Circuit's opinion is well reasoned and its con-
clusions adequately supported. No issues are left over to be decided 
in later cases as was true in those cases which adopted the First 
Circuit's interpretation. 
One commentator, after a cursory review of the First, Eighth and 
Fifth Circuit decisions, characterized the Fifth Circuit opinion as 
being more in line with the intent of Congress. 117 This commentator 
presented only one major argument in support of his contention. He 
argued that emissions from multiple sources are practically untrace-
able and it is virtually impossible to relate emissions from a single 
source to air quality in a region with any certainty. Furthermore, 
few sources individually endanger public health. It is the multiplied 
effect of combined emissions from many sources that creates a pol-
luted atmosphere. Assuming that Congress was well aware of the 
truth of these statements, he concluded that §1857c-5(f) was in-
tended to be the exclusive method of postponing any requirement 
of a state implementation plan. This argument is well taken and 
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provides support for the Fifth Circuit position although it does not 
seem to be an adequate enough basis for an authoritative position. 
vn. RECENT EPA ACTION 
Believing that the Fifth Circuit's decision was wrong, the EPA 
asked the Supreme Court to review the pertinent part of that deci-
sion. On June 10, 1974 the Supreme Court, with Justice Douglas 
dissenting, granted a stay of the Fifth Circuit's order relating to that 
section of its opinion pending disposition of the petition for certior-
ari. 118 On October 15, 1974 certiorari was granted,l18 Hopefully the 
Supreme Court will consider all of the issues and clarify the confus-
ing aspects of the prior decisions. 120 
On September 26, 1974 the EPA amended its regulations and 
proposed new provisions for all state implementation plans in order 
to be consistent with the decisions of the First, Second and Eighth 
Circuits. 121 The new regulations122 allow deferral of a compliance 
schedule deadline, but not beyond the applicable attainment date 
specified in the implementation plan. When there are different pri-
mary and secondary ambient air quality attainment dates, the appl-
icable date is determined on the basis of whether the implementa-
tion plan requirement being deferred is necessary for attainment of 
primary or secondary ambient air quality standards. Where there 
has been a §1857c-5(e) extension beyond July 31, 1975, compliance 
may be deferred up to the end of the extension only for those sources 
for which the extension was granted. The proposed provisions for all 
state implementation plans are in accordance with the revised regu-
lations and would provide all state implementation plans with uni-
form deferral provisions. 123 
The text accompanying the amended regulations helps to resolve 
some of the issues left untouched by the Circuit court decisions. The 
text notes that the First, Second and Eighth Circuits seemed to 
discuss only primary standards but that the new regulations apply 
to both primary and secondary standards. 124 The text also clarifies 
the applicable attainment date and the effect of a §1857c-5(e) ex-
tension. 
The new EPA regulations are not in total accord with the First, 
Second and Eighth Circuit decisions. The new regulationsl25 permit 
deferrals to sources granted §1857c-5(e) extensions up until the ex-
tended date for attainment of primary standards. However, as 
pointed out previously, the Second Circuit called May 31, 1975 the 
mandatory deadline, notwithstanding §1857c-5(e) extensions effec-
tive until May 31, 1977 for certain primary standards. 128 
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The EPA text also states that the First, Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits all held that "source compliance dates could be deferred 
through ... [revision] only up to the attainment date for meeting 
the primary ambient air quality standards" [emphasis added].127 
The new EPA regulations call the implementation plan dates the 
applicable ones and allow revisions until this date. 
The First, Second and Eighth Circuit decisions were not com-
pletely uniform. Although the Second Circuit discussion referred 
only to primary standards, the First Circuit remedy spoke of the 
"federal compliance dates for attainment of national primary and 
secondary standards."128 However, the First Circuit opinion for the 
most part discussed only primary ambient air quality standards. 
Therefore it is unclear whether all of the decisions did indeed only 
refer to primary ambient air quality standard dates as the EPA 
language quoted above suggests. 
Another discrepancy between the three Circuits cited by the EPA 
was with respect to the date ending the pre-attainment period. This 
date was variously described as the "mandatory deadline,"129 the 
"mandatory compliance date, "130 the "mandatory attainment 
date,"131 and the "federal compliance dates for attainment of na-
tional primary and secondary standards."132 This final description 
seems to refer to the statutory latest compliance dates but the EPA 
Administrator has chosen to use the implementation plan attain-
ment dates. Although not completely in accord with the descrip-
tions used in the cases, the implementation plan dates do not sub-
stitute an entirely different standard because the implementation 
plan dates would probably be used as evidence of the reasonable 
time necessary to attain secondary standards under the Amend-
ments, and the EPA allows revision of primary standard attainment 
dates set prior to the expiration of the statutory maximum of three 
years for attainment of national primary standards. 133 
The three cases cited did not allow deferrals up to the attainment 
dates. The First and Second Circuits held that deferrals "not incon-
sistent with national objectives" would be allowedl34 and the Eighth 
Circuit followed the First Circuit in all respects. By this language 
the First Circuit meant that a deferral could not "threaten attain-
ment of full compliance within the mandatory time period."135 
Thus, the EPA statement concerning the holdings of these cases is 
incorrect. These decisions did not allow deferrals up to the attain-
ment dates. The new EPA regulations, however, are based on this 
misreading of the decision. The new regulations allow state revision 
without resort to §1857c-5(f) when "compliance is not deferred be-
yond the applicable attainment date." This substitutes an entirely 
different and weaker standard for the one adopted in the decisions. 
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Under the new EPA regulations deferrals can be allowed which 
interfere with attainment of an ambient air quality standard as long 
as the deferral ends on or before the applicable attainment date. 
Not only do these new regulations substitute a different standard, 
they also seem to emasculate §1857c-5(f). Implementation plans 
must provide for attainment and maintenance of national ambient 
air quality standards under §1857c-5(a)(2)(B). Presumably, once 
attainment is achieved no new emission limitation deadlines must 
be met to ensure maintenance. Thus there may be few if any emis-
sions deadlines in the post-attainment period. Under the new EPA 
regulations, §1857c-5(f) cannot apply prior to the arrival of a na-
tional ambient air quality deadline but most of the emission limita-
tion deadlines to which §1857c-5(f) applies, if not all of them, are 
in the pre-attainment period. Therefore §1857c-5(f) is only of use if 
a deferral is to extend into, or begin during, the post-attainment 
period. This problem did not arise in the First Circuit decision since 
deferral by revision was not allowed if attainment or maintenance 
of national standards was threatened. 
These new EPA regulations also run afoul of the clear Congres-
sional intention that national ambient air quality standards be at-
tained within the time limits provided in the statute unless specific 
statutory exemptions are met. 138 The new regulations require that 
deferrals end on or before the applicable attainment date but do not 
require that national ambient air quality standards be attained 
within the statutory time limit. Apparently even the EPA has fallen 
prey to the confusion surrounding the Amendments. 
VIII. IMPACT OF THE THREE INTERPRETATIONS 
No court has carefully considered the differing effects of the three 
different interpretations of the Amendments. Vague statements 
have been made about harshness on sources or adoption of more 
lenient compliance schedules. A well reasoned choice between the 
interpretations should involve a more thorough consideration of the 
consequences which the various interpretations would have on 
sources, air quality, and the EPA administrative structure. 
Under the Fifth Circuit interpretation of the Amendments, a pol-
lution source has three alternatives as its state implementation plan 
compliance deadline approaches. It can either come into compli-
ance with the implementation plan, meet the requirements for a 
§1857c-5(f) postponement, or close down. It might be expected that 
sources will exert pressure when compliance schedules are drawn up 
to make them as lenient as possible so as to avoid, insofar as possi-
ble, the harsh effect of this interpretation. The result will probably 
1970 CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS 585 
be that compliance schedules will be sufficient to satisfy the federal 
law but not much better. Compliance schedules and national am-
bient air quality standards will be met on time. The EPA adminis-
trative structure will remain complex and constantly busy but will 
not be bothered by reviewing state-granted deferrals by revision. 
Under the First Circuit interpretation of the Amendments, a pol-
lution source has four possible alternatives as its compliance sched-
ule deadline approaches. In addition to those permitted by the Fifth 
Circuit, it may request a deferral by revision, if the applicable at-
tainment date has not been reached and if attainment and mainte-
nance of national ambient air quality standards will not be threat-
ened. Such a deferral would expire not later than the attainment 
date. Sources can still be expected to exert pressure when compli-
ance schedules are drawn up, since receiving an EPA approved revi-
sion will be time-consuming, will not be assured, and the original 
implementation plan requirement will still have to be met on or 
before the original attainment date. Moreover, revisions can be re-
quested only when: (1) a compliance schedule requirement must be 
met before the applicable attainment date for national ambient air 
quality standards, (2) the original compliance schedule requirement 
will be met on or before the applicable attainment date for national 
standards, and (3) the revision (deferral) will not affect attainment 
or maintenance of a national standard. Since, to a polluter, the 
advantage of this supposedly more flexible procedure is limited, 
compliance schedules will probably not be any more ambitious than 
under the Fifth Circuit interpretation. Thus the ambient air quality 
which the compliance schedules are designed to achieve will proba-
bly be very similar in both Circuits. Compliance schedules will not 
be met on time in their entirety but national ambient air quality 
standards will be met within the time provided by the Amend-
ments, albeit somewhat slower in the First, Second and Eighth 
Circuits because some deferrals will be allowed. The EPA adminis-
trative structure will be made more complex and kept busier under 
this interpretation. A method of dealing with compliance schedule 
revisions (deferrals) must be provided and all of the revision re-
quests must be considered. This would not be true under the Fifth 
Circuit interpretation. 
Under the original EPA interpretation of the Amendments, a pol-
lution source still has only four possible alternatives as its compli-
ance schedule deadline approaches. However, these alternatives are 
less restricted than under the First Circuit interpretation, because 
the source may request an open-ended revision (deferral) if such 
revision will not affect attainment or maintenance of national am-
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bient air quality standards. Although receiving an EPA approved 
revision will still be time consuming and not guaranteed, from a 
source's point of view this is the most advantageous interpretation. 
A revision can be granted whenever attainment and maintenance of 
national ambient air quality standards will not be affected. Al-
though this more liberal deferral policy is advantageous to sources, 
it is unclear whether the possibility of qualifying for a future deferral 
will prompt sources to accept more ambitious compliance schedules 
than they would under the Fifth and First Circuit interpretations. 
National standards will be met at about the same time as under the 
First Circuit interpretation,' but the ambient air quality that the 
compliance schedule was designed to achieve may not be attained 
until much later. Since there would be many more revisions requests 
under this interpretation, the EPA administrative structure would 
be heavily burdened. 
All three interpretations will ensure achievement of national 
ambient air quality standards within the time period provided by 
the Amendments. It is unclear, however, what the effect of the 
interpretation adopted will be on the level of ambient air quality 
achieved. This will depend on the strictness or leniency of the com-
pliance schedules. However, it is difficult to predict the effect that 
adoption of one of the three interpretations will have on this varia-
ble. The Fifth Circuit interpretation is most demanding on sources. 
Presumably ifthat interpretation is adopted sources will attempt to 
pressure the states to set lenient compliance schedules. It cannot be 
said with any certainty that the advantages of the First Circuit and 
original EPA interpretations to sources will induce them to accept 
stricter compliance schedules. Even if stricter compliance schedules 
are adopted, the granting of deferrals may result in slower achieve-
ment of national standards or a lower air quality level than under 
the Fifth Circuit interpretation. At best, the impact the interpreta-
tion adopted will have on ambient air quality is speculative. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The complex nature of the Amendments' provisions demands 
that any attempt to explain the revision - postponement distinction 
in the Amendments address all of the arguments and carefully ex-
plain the reasons for adopting one interpretation and rejecting the 
others. Special care should be used to adopt a uniform terminology 
and explain exactly what is being decided. No court has undertaken 
such an analysis. Commentators have not dealt extensively with 
this issue and those who did consider it did not have the benefit of 
all of the decisions and arguments considered here. Hopefully the 
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Supreme Court's decision will add clarity and precision to the de-
bate as well as uniformity among the Circuits. 
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